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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-102(2) (j) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
a.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in granting

plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment based upon
its conclusion that, as a matter of law, plaintiff did not
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in the contractual relationship between the parties
when it failed to cooperate in providing Mr. Marin with the
marketing tools which were necessary in order for Mr. Marin
to meet his performance guarantees.

This issued was

preserved for review in Mr. Marin's Response to Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

(R. 0119)

Standard of review: Review of the district court's grant of
summary judgment is for correctness, according no deference
Brown

to that court's legal conclusions.

v.

Moore,

973 P.2d

950, 953 (Utah 1998).
Determinative law: Rawson
Moore,

v.

Conover,

876; Brown

v.

Benedict's

Dev. v. St. Benedict's

1991); and Andalex

2001 UT 24, 20 P.3d

973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998);

Resources,

Hosp.,
Inc.

(Utah App. 1994).
1

v.

St.

811 P.2d 194 (Utah

Myers,

871 P.2d 1041

b.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in the amount of

attorney fees awarded to plaintiff.

This issue was

preserved in Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed
Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit.

(R. 0499)

Standard of review: The standard of review on appeal of the
amount of a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent
error or clear abuse of discretion.

Jensen

UT 81, 1127, 130 P.3d 325 (citing Valcarce

v.

Sawyers,

v.

2005

Fitzgerald,

961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998)).
Determinative law: Jensen
325; Foote
Bank

v.

Madsen,
c.

v.

Bracken,

Clark,

v.

Sawyers,

2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d

962 P.2d 54 (Utah 1998); Dixie

State

764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); and Gardner

v.

949 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1997).

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in awarding to

plaintiff as "costs'7 its expenditures for photocopies,
overnight mail, courier, postage, online research, etc.
This issue was preserved in Defendant's Objection to
Plaintiff's Proposed Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit.

(R.

0499)
Standard of review: A trial court's decision to award the
prevailing party costs is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.

Jensen

v.

130 P.3d 325 (citing Young v.
P.3d 549).
2

Sawyers,

State,

205 UT 81, 1 140,

2000 UT 91, % 4, 16

Determinative law: Rule 54(d), Utah Rules
Procedure;

Frampton

v.

Wilson,

of

Civil

605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).

DETERMINATIVE RULE
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

(c) Motion and proceedings
thereon.
The motion, memoranda
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from final orders of the Fourth Judicial

District Court of Utah County.
II.

Statement of Facts
1. Plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and selling

therapeutic grade essential oils and wellness supplements.
Historically, plaintiff has sold its products through a network
of individuals who are for the most part practitioners of
alternative medicine, massage therapists, and quasi-naturopath
non-licensed wellness enthusiasts.

When plaintiff's

representatives first contacted Mr. Marin, they represented to
Mr. Marin that they desired to increase their company's sales
volume using a mainstream network marketing model, i.e.,

3

marketing their products through traditional network marketing
sales representatives directly to the individual consumer.
Plaintiff's representatives were aware of the fact that Mr. Marjn
had previously built a global network of more than 500,000
distributors for Amway Corporation using a mainstream network
marketing model.

(R. 0126)

2. The parties entered into a Field Advisor to Executive
Board Distributor Agreement on January 12, 2005 (hereinafter the
NX

Agreement") .

(R. 0090)

3. Paragraph 18 of the Agreement provides that u:here are no
representations, warranties, or other agreements between the
Parties in connection with the subject matter hereof except as
specifically set forth herein."

(R. 0032)

4. Under paragraph 4 of the Agreement, plaintiff agreed to
pay Mr. Marin advance payments of:
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005);
$25,000 on 15 February 2005;
$25,000 on 15 March 2005; and
$25,000 on 15 April 2005.
(R. 0089)
5. Under paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement, Mr. Marin agreed
that he would meet the following performance guarantees of
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates:
$5,000 by 15 February 2005;
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$30,000 by 15 March 2005;
$100,000 by 15 April 2005;
$300,000 by 15 May 2005;
$600,000 by 15 June 2005; and
$900,000 by 15 July 2005.
(R. 0089)
6. Paragraph 6.1 of the Agreement provides for Mr. Marin's
payment of plaintiff's "legal fees" arising from "contravention
... of any of the terms and conditions imposed on [Mr. Marin]
pursuant to this Agreement."

(R. 0085)

7. On January 12, 2005, in connection with the execution of
the Agreement, plaintiff paid a $25,000 advance to Mr. Marin.
(R. 0368)
8. By February 15, 2005, Mr. Marin met his $5,000 cumulative
"auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph
3.4 of the Agreement;

(R. 0368)

9. Accordingly, on February 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr.
Marin another $25,000 advance.

(R. 0368)

10. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his $30, 000 cumulative auto
ship sales volume performance guarantee by March 15, 2005 in
accordance with paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement.

(R. 0368)

11. On March 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr. Marin another
$15,000 advance.

(R. 0368)
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12. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his April 15, 2005
performance guarantee by April 15, 2005.

(R. 0368)

13. As part of its pitch to induce Mr. Marin to enter into
the Agreement, plaintiff represented to Mr. Marin that plaintiff
was nearing completion of a new mainstream marketing website,
recruiting DVD, audio CD, and other marketing materials
(hereinafter referred to as the ''marketing tools") .

It was

clearly understood by both plaintiff and Mr. Marin that -these
marketing tools would be absolutely necessary in order for Mr.
Marin to be able to meet his performance guarantees under the
Agreement and it was represented to Mr. Marin that they would be
available for use by February 1, 2005.

No experienced leader in

the irdustry would agree to the performance guarantees without
having these marketing tools.

(R. 0126-0125)

14. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeatedly promised to do
so, plaintiff failed to provide Mr. Marin with any of the
necessary marketing tools (except for one mediocre but expensive
brochure which Mr. Marin's distributors were not interested in
purchasing).

After plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing

tools by February 1, 2005, as promised, Mr. Marin spent more than
a month working on his own and in conjunction with the third
party vendor hired by plaintiff, Rainmaker Consulting Group, in
order expedite the delivery of the marketing tools.

Mr. Marin

wrote more than 20 marketing and training scripts for video and

6

web based content.

On two occasions, Mr. M a n n traveled to St.

Augustine, Florida to v/ork with Rainmaker Consulting shooting
marketing videos.

To Mr. Marin's knowledge, the videos have

never been completed.

(R. 0125)

15. It was only based upon plaintiff's representations and
the parties' mutual understanding that these marketing tools we^e
almost ready and would be provided in a timely manner, that Mr.
M a n n agreed to the pei formance guarantees contained in paragraph
3.4 of the Agreement.

Witnout the marketing tools there was

virtually no possibility that Mr. Marin could have met his
performance guarantees.

(R. 0125)

16. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to
proviae the marketing tools as promised, Mr. Marin contacted Gary
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David Stirling,
plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with his growing concerns
about his ability to meet his performance guarantees.

Mr. Young

and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to
perform as promised, assured Mr. Marin that his inability to
satisfy his performance guarantees would not affect his receipt
of the advance payment of $25,000 due February 15, 2005, and
expressed their confidence that the marketing tools would be
ready for Mr. Marin's use by mid-February to early March 2005.
(R. 0125-0124)
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17. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, plaintiff's
Chief Financial Officei, informed Mr. Marin that cue to Mr.
Marin's failure to meet his March 15, 2005, performance
guarantee, plaintiff was considering withholding further payment
to Mr. M a n n under the Agreement.

In response, Mr. Marin made at

very clear to Mr. Bentley that his failure to satisfy his
performance guarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff's
failure to provide the promised marketing tools, that he could
and would meet his performance guarantees when the tools were
provided, and that he expected pJairtiff to continue making
payment to him in accoidance with the terms of the Agreement.
Mr. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to perform as
promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated that its website
would be completed within aporoximately two weeks, and stated
that plaintiff would be making a partial $15,000 payment to Mr.
Marin.

(R. 0124)

18. On April 12, 2005, Mr. Marin spoke again witi Gary Young
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools.
Mr. Young responded by telling Mr. Marin that he would x'get to
the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do.

(R. 0124-

0123)
19. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to provide
Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which he needed to do his job,
and despite its requests for Mr. Marin to remain patient while it
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contirued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools,
plaintiff failed to pay Mr. Marin $10,000 of the advance payment
due March 15, 2005 in accordance with paragraph 4 of the
Agreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance payment
due to be paid to Mr. Marin on April 15, 2005.

(R. 0123)

20. On April 26, 2005, Mr. Marin telephoned Mr

Stirling

regaraing plaintiff's failure to provide the promised marKet^ng
tools.

Mr. Stirling again assured Mr. Marin that they would be

provided soon and again requested that Mr. Marin be patient.

(R.

0123)
21. On May 3, 200^, Mr. Stilling notified Mr. Marin that he
had received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e.,

vx

John's

folks") ''which indicated they are making progress" on the
website.

Mr. Stirling asked Mr. Marin to uhold tight."

Thus, 49

days after plaintiff stopped making payments to Mr. Marin in
accordance with the Agreement, plaintiff acknowleaged that it had
still not provided Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which were
absolutely essential for him to be able to do his job and
requested his continued patience.

(R. 0123)

22. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not
provided any of the marketing tools which Mr. Marin needed in
order to do his job, Mr. Marin spoke with Mr. Young and informed
him that he believed he had been patient long enough in waiting
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that he could no
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longer afford to continue to his contractual relatiorship with
plaintiff.

(R. 0123-0122)

23. The Complaint commencing this action was filed on July
26, 2006.

(R. 0023)

Mr. Marin filed his Answer on December 15,

2006 (R. 0057) and an Amended Answer on December 18, 2006.

(R.

0063)
24.

Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on March 21, 2007.

(R. 0105)

Mr. Marin filed his Response to

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007.

(R. 0111)

25. Following a hearing held October 1, 2007, the trial
court issued its Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and denying Mr. Marin's Counter-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

(R. 0462)

26. On May 27, 2008, plaintiff filed a Motion for Order of
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Cause of Action.

(R. 0495)

On that same date,

plaintiff submitted a Proposed Final Judgment and an Affidavit of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

(R. 0505)

27. Mr. Marin served his Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed
Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit on June 7, 2008.

(R. 0499)

28. On June 12, 2008, the trial court entereo a Final
Judgment in which it awarded plaintiff $61,362.43 in compensatory
damages and (despite the fact that this was a relatively simple
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case in which neither party conducted any discovery and which was
decided on summary judgment) awarded plaintiff $45,502.43 in
costs and attorney fees.

(R. 0505)

29. Mr. Marin filed his Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2008.
(R. 0514)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment based the undisputed fact that Mr. Marin
failed to meet his "performance guarantees."

In opposing

plaintiff's motion, Mr. Marin does not deny that he failed to
meet his performance guarantees.

However, it is Mr. Marin's

position that plaintiff's prior material breach of its obligation
of good faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin from further
performance under the Agreement.
Protection

See,

e.g.,

Holbrook

v.

Master

Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994) (one party's

material breach excuses the other party's further performance).
Specifically, Mr. Marin contends that plaintiff's failure to
provide him with the marketing tools which he needed in order to
satisfy his performance guarantees constitutes a prior material
breach of plaintiff's obligation to cooperate with Mr. Marin and
to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectations and
with the parties' agreed common purpose, thereby excusing Mr.
Marin from his performance guarantees.

See Rawson

v.

Conover,

2001 UT 24, 1 44, 20 P.3d 876(a party must act consistently with
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the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the
other party); and PDQ Lube

Center,

Inc.

V.

Huber,

949 P.2d 792,

798 (Utah App. 1997) ("one party may not render it difficult or
impossible for the other to continue performance and then take
advantage of the nonperformance he has caused'') .
The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of
attorney fees awarded to plaintiff.

This is a very simple breach

of contract case in which neither party conducted any discovery
and which was decided on summary judgment.

Nevertheless, the

trial court awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney foes.

In

determining the amount of a reasonable fee, a trial court may
consider, inter alia, "the difficulty cf the litigation, [and]
the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case...''
State

Bank

v. Bracken,

764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).

DIXJ

e

Mr. Marin

respectfully submits that if plaintiff spent the kind of time
necessary to incur $43,903 in attorney fees, it did so
inefficiently and Mr. Marin should not be required to pay for
that kind of inefficiency.
Additionally, a party requesting attorney fees is required
to categorized the time and fees expended on successful claims
for which fees may be awarded, unsuccessful claims for which fees
might have been awarded if the claims had been successful, and
claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.
Jensen

v.

Sawyers,

2005 UT 81, 1132, 130 P. 3 325 (quoting
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Foote

v.

Clark,

962 P.2d 54, 54 (Utah 1998).

In the case at bar,

plaintiff failed to categorized its fee request.
Moreover, plaintiff was awarded thousands of dollars in
attorney fees which it incurred in connection with: ''Defendant's
Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of Order" and "Plaintiff's
Motion to Reconsider."

However, plaintiff did not prevail on

either matter (R. 392 & 448) and should, therefore, not be
entitled to recover any attorney fees incurred in litigating
them.

See

Gardner

v.

Madsen,

949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. App.

1997)(trial court should make adjustments to fee request so that
the prevailing party "does not recover fees attributable to
issues on which he did not prevail").
The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding
plaintiff "costs" In the amount of $1,599.43, all but $235.00 of
which were for photocopies, overnight mail, courier, postage,
online research, etc.

"Costs," as used in Rule 54(d)(1), URCP,

means those fees which are required to be paid to the court and
to witnesses, and which are authorized by statute to be included
in a judgment.

Frampton

v. Wilson,

605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).

There is no statute which would authorize plaintiff to recover as
costs its expenditures for "photocopies, overnight mail, courier,
postage, and online research."

13

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THERE IS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF BREACHED
ITS OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
Whether there has been a breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally
inappropriate for decision as a matter of law.
Inc.

v.

Won-Door

Corp.,

Republic

Group,

883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994).

Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no disputed
material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Brown

950, 953 (Utah 1998).

v.

Moore,

973 P.2d

"Because disposition of a case by summary

judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt
concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor
of the party opposing the motion." Beehive
Brick

Co.,

Brick

Co.

v.

Robinson

780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988).

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is premised
on Mr. Marin's breach of contract as alleged in the First Cause
of Action set forth in plaintiff's Complaint.

Specifically,

plaintiff alleges that Mr. Marin breached the Agreement by
failing to meet his ''performance guarantees."
In opposing plaintiff's motion, Mr. Marin does not deny that
he failed to meet his performance guarantees.

However, it is Mr.

Marin's position that plaintiff's failure to provide him with the
14

marketing tools which were necessary for him to satisfy his
performance guarantees was a prior material breach of its
obligation of good faith and fair dealing which excused Mr, Marin
from further performance under the Agreement, and specifically
excused him from his performance guarantees.
v.

Master

Protection

Corp.,

See,

e.g.,

Holbrook

883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App.

1994) (one party's material breach excuses the other party's
further performance).
Under Utah law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair
See,

dealing inheres to all contractual relationships.
Rawson

v.

Conover,

2001 UT 24, SI 44, 20 P. 3d 876.

e.g.,

In order to

comply with its obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
"... a party must act consistently 'with the agreed common
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party.'
In analyzing for compliance with the covenant, both the
contract language and the course of dealings between the
parties should be considered to determine the parties'
purpose, intentions, and expectations."
Id.

(citations omitted).

Particularly applicable to the case at

bar, this means that "one party may not render it difficult or
impossible for the other to continue performance and then take
advantage of the nonperformance he has caused."
Inc.

V. Huber,

Properties,
also

949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utah App. 1997)(quoting

Inc.

Gregorson

PDQ Lube

V. Holt,
v.

Jensen,

Center,
Zion's

538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); see
617 P.2d 369, 373 n.9 (Utah 1980) (xx...

parties are obligated to cooperate with each other in good faith
in the performance of a contract"); Markham
15

v.

Bradley,

2007 UT

App 379, SI 18, 173 P.3d 865 (v\ . . one party may not render it
difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and
then take advantage of the non-performance he.has caused"); and
17A Am Jur

2d Contracts

§ 370 (NX [W] henever the cooperation of the

promissee is necessary for the performance of the promise, there
is a condition implied that the cooperation will be given" ).
In his Affidavit submitted in opposition to plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mr. Marin offered the
following testimony in support of his claim that plaintiff
breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing:

4. In order to induce me to enter into the Agreement,
plaintiff represented to me that it was nearing completion
of a new mainstream marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio
CD, and other marketing materials (hereinafter referred to
as the "marketing tools"). It was clearly understood by
both plaintiff and myself that these marketing tools would
be absolutely necessary in order for me to be able to meet
my performance guarantees under the Agreement and it was
represented to me that they would be available for "use by
February 1, 2005. No experienced leader in this industry
would agree to these performance guarantees without having
these marketing tools.
5. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeatedly promised
to do so, plaintiff failed to provide me with any of the
necessary marketing tools (except for one mediocre but
expensive brochure which my distributors were not interested
in purchasing). After plaintiff's failure to provide the
marketing tools by February 1, 2005, as promised, I spent
more than a month working on my own and in conjunction with
the third party vendor hired by plaintiff, Rainmaker
Consulting Group, in order expedite the delivery of the
marketing tools. I wrote more than 20 marketing and
training scripts for video and web based content. On two
occasions, I traveled to St. Augustine, Florida to work with
Rainmaker Consulting shooting marketing videos. To my
16

knowledge, the videos have never been completed.
6. It was only based upon plaintiff's representations
and our mutual understanding that these marketing tools were
almost ready and would be provided in a timely manner, that
I agreed to the performance guarantees contained in
paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement. Without the marketing tools
there was virtually no possibility that I could have met the
performance guarantees.
7. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed
to provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David
Stirling, plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with my
growing concerns about my ability to meet the performance
guarantees. Mr. Young and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that
plaintiff had failed to perform as promised, assured me that
my inability to satisfy the performance guarantees would not
affect my receipt of the advance payment of $25,000 due
February 15, 2005, and expressed their confidence that the
marketing tools would be ready for my use by mid-February to
early March 2005.
8. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley,
plaintiff s Chief Financial Officer, informed me that due to
my failure to meet the March 15, 2005 performance guarantee,
plaintiff was considering withholding further payment to me
under the Agreement. In response, I made it very clear to
Mr. Bentley that my failure to satisfy the performance
guarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure
to provide the promised marketing tools, that I could and
would meet my performance guarantees when the tools were
provided, and that I expected plaintiff to continue making
payment to me in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
Mr. Bentley acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to
perform as promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated
that its website would be completed within approximately two
weeks, and stated that plaintiff would be making a partial
$15,000 payment to me.
9. On April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary 'Young
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing
tools. Mr. Young responded by telling me that he would NNget
to the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do.
10. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to
provide me with the marketing tools which I needed to do my
job, and despite its requests that I remain patient while it
17

continued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools,
plaintiff failed to pay me $10,000 of the advance payment
due March 15, 2005 in accordance writh paragraph 4 of the
Agreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance
payment due to be .paid to me on April'15, 2005.
11. On April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling
regarding plaintiff's failure to provide the promised
marketing tools. Mr. Stirling again assured me that they
would be provided soon and again requested my patience.
12. On May 3, 2007, Mr. Stirling notified me that he
had received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e.,
"John's folks) "which indicated they are making progress'' on
the website. Mr. Stirling asked me to "hold tight". A copy
of the e-mail is attached hereto. Thus, 49 cays after
plaintiff stopped making payments to me m accordance with
the Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had still not.
provided me with the marketing tools which were absoJutely
essential for me to be able to do my job and again requested
my continued patience.
13. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still
not provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in
order to do my job, I spoke with Mr. Young and informed him
that I believed I had been patient long enough in waiting
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that I could
no longer afford to continue to my contractual relationship
with plaintiff.
(R. 0126-0122)
Mr. Marin's respectfully submits that his testimony is
sufficient to establish issues of fact as to whether plaintiff
failed to act consistently with the parties' agreed upon common
purpose of marketing and distributing plaintiff's product through
a mainstream network marketing model, whether plaintiff failed to
act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectation that
plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the marketing tools
necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy his performance
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guarantees, and whether plaintiff made it difficult or impossible
for Mr. Marin to meet his performance guarantees and is now
attempting to take advantage of the non-performance which it
caused.
The trial court, however, rejected Mr. Marin's defense on
the basis that N'[i]t is well settled that the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to impose new,
independent duties in a written agreement."l

The trial court

also reasoned that the parol evidence rule barred the testimony
which Mr. Marin offered to prove his claim.

Mr. Marin

respectfully submits that the trial court's conclusions are
erroneous.
(A) Mr. Marin is not attempting to impose new, independent
duties into the parties' Agreement.
The trial court was correct in recognizing that; " [ i ] t is
well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a
written agreement.'72
1998).

See Brown v.

Moore,

973 P. 2d 950, 955 (Utah

However, it is equally well settled that a breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing may result from an
obligation, express or implied, which arises not from the
language of the contract, but from the course of dealings and

X

(R. 456)

2

(R. 456)
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conduct of the parties.
Benedicts

Dev.

v.

St.

Benedicts

2001); and Myers, supra,
In Brown,

Brown,

supra,

973 P.2d at 954;

St.

Hosp.,

811 P. 2d 194, 200 (Utah

871 P.2d at 1048.

the Supreme Court of Utah explained that

NN

[i]n

determining whether a party has breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, we are not limited to an examination of
the express contractual provisions; we will also consider the
course of dealing between the parties."

97 3 P.2d at 954

The Brown plaintiffs nad

(citations omitted)(emphasis added).

purchased all of the stock of Western Heritage Thrift and Loan
pursuant to an agreement which they entered into with the Utah
Department of Financial Institutions (DFI).

Because the

plaintiffs were not infusing new capital sufficient to meet the
minimum requirements under Utah law,

NX

DFI told plaintiffs that

the necessary additional capital could be supplied by the Utah
Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation's (ILGC) purchase of
$2,000,000 of 'net worth certificates' from Western Heritage,
which DFI would recognize as cash equivalents for accounting
purposes in meeting capitalization requirements."
952.

973 P.2d at

Approximately two years later, the ILGC became insolvent

and, as a consequence, Western Heritage became a failing
depository institution because it was no longer able to use the
net worth certificates in calculating its operating capital.
Following DFI's seizure of Western Heritage due to its failure to
20

maintain adequate capital, the plaintiffs filed suit claiming,
inter alia, that

VX

DFI breached the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing by taking possession of Western Heritage before
the lapse of a period sufficient to permit them to recover their
investment.

Plaintiffs assert [ed] that ... DFI was obligated to

continue crediting the ILGC net v/orth certificates toward capital
requirements imposed by State law."

973 P.2d at 954.

The trial court granted summary judgment in DFI's favor and
the Supreme Court affirmed, explaining the analytical framework
for its decision as follows:
In this case, an examination of the contract language
reveals no express obligation on the part of DFI to allow
plaintiffs to operate Western Heritage for a sufficient
period to recoup their investment. Nor is there any
language which guarantees that DFI will continue to count
the net worth certificates toward capital requirements for
any specific amount of time... Thus, if plaintiffs are to
defeat summary judgment, the course of dealings between the
parties must disclose some other obligation, express or
implied, on the part of DFI which could give rise to a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Id.

Because the plaintiffs were unable to do so, the Supreme

Court affirmed the summary judgment order:
"Because no express or implied obligations of or
representations by DFI indicated that DFI would recognize
the net worth certificates regardless of the ILGC's
finanical condition, DFI's eventual decision to discontinue
doing so cannot form the basis of a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. A contrary holding would
^establish new,.independent rights or duties not agreed upon
by the parties.'"
973 P.2d at 955 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
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In short, the Brown court clearly recognized that a cause of
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing may arise from obligations or representations, express or
implied, which are not found in the language of the contract
itself.

See also,

St.

Benedicts

Dev.,

supra,

811 P.2d at 200 -

(the Court examined the ''parties' conduct" in finding that the
plaintiff had stated a claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing); and Myers,

supra,

871 P.2d at

1048 (parties' "course of dealings" failed to establish a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
In the case at bar, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that his
testimony regarding the parties' course of dealing and conduct is
sufficient to establish issues of fact as to: (a) whether
plaintiff failed to act consistently with the parties' agreed
upon common purpose of marketing and distributing plaintiff s
product through a mainstream network marketing model; (b) whether
plaintiff failed to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified
expectation that plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the
marketing tools necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy
his performance guarantees; and (c) whether plaintiff failed to
cooperate in providing the necessary marketing tools thereby
making it difficult or impossible for Mr. Marin to meet his
performance guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of
the non-performance which it caused.
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Because there is a dispute as to these material issues of
fact, the trial court's Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment was improper and should he reversed.
(B) The parol evidence rule is not implicated because the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres to
all contractual relationships.
The trial court also concluded that Mr. Marin's claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
''necessarily implicates the parol evidence rule. It is well
settled that 'the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the
absence of fraud of other invalidating causes, to exclude
evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations,
or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding
to the terms of an integrated
contract."3
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that trial court's conclusion is
erroneous.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres m
contract.

See,

e.g.,

Markham

v.

Bradley,

supra,

every

173 P.3d at 871.

Because the covenant was already part of the contract at issue in
this case, it follows that Mr. Marin's testimony in support of
his claim for breach of the covenant was not ''offered for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of" the contract.
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the parol
evidence rule barred Mr. Marin's testimony.

3

(R. 456)(trial court's emphasis).
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY
FEES OF $43,903 IN THIS RELATIVELY SIMPLE BREACH OF CONTRACT
CASE IN WHICH NEITHER PARTY CONDUCTED ANY DISCOVERY AND
WHICH WAS DECIDED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The trial court av/arded plaintiff attorney fees in the

amount of $43,903.

Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial

court abused its discretion in awarding such an excessive amount
of fees.

This is a very simple breach of contract case which was

decided on summary judgment.

Neither party conducted any

discovery of any kind.
Calculation of the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
v. Bracken,

764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).

Dixie

State

Bank

In determining the

amount of a reasonable fee, the trial court may consider, inter
alia,

NX

the difficulty of the litigation, [and] the efficiency of

the attorneys in presenting the case..."

Id.

Cottrell,

This was not a

694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983).

difficult case.

(quoting Cabrera

v.

The only issue which the trial court was

required to determine in order to grant summary judgment was
whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether
plaintiff's prior material breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin's performance under the
Agreement.

This was a relatively simple issue which should have

required very little attorney time to address.

It certainly

should not have required tens of thousands of dollars.
Accordingly, if plaintiff did spend that kind of timer it did so
24

inefficiently and Mr. Marin should not be required to pay for
that kind of inefficiency.
Additionally, a party requesting attorney fees must
"categorize the time and fees expended for ^successful
claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney
fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there may be an
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful,
and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney
fees. ' "
Jensen
v.

v.

Clark,

Sawyers,

Foote

2005 UT 81, 5132, 130 P. 3 325 (quoting

962 P.2d 54, 54 (Utah 1998).

In the case at bar,

plaintiff failed to categorized its fee request.

(R. 0492)

Moreover, plaintiff was awarded thousands of dollars for the
attorney fees which it incurred in connection with:
a. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of
Order; and
b. Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider.
However, plaintiff did not prevail on either matter (R. 392 &
448) and should, therefore, not be entitled to recover any
attorney fees incurred in litigating them.

See

Foote

v.

Clark,

962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998) ("the court should not reimburse
counsel for time spent pursuing ungrounded and infeasible
theories of recovery); and Gardner

v.

Madsenf

949 P.2d 785, 792

(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (trial court should make adjustments to fee
request so that the prevailing party "does not recover fees
attributable to issues on which he did not prevail'').
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING AS COSTS
PLAINTIFF'S EXPENDITURES FOR PHOTOCOPIES, OVERNIGHT MAIL,
COURIER, POSTAGE, ONLINE RESEARCH, ETC.
The trial court also awarded plaintiff "costs" in the amount
of $1,599.43.

However, with the exceptions of its $155 filing

fee and $80 service of process fee, the "costs" which plaintiff
was awarded are not taxable ''costs" within the meaning of Rule
54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Ci\il Procedure.

"Costs," as used

in subdivision (d)(1), means those fees which are required to be
paid to the court and to witnesses, and which are authorizeo by
statute to be included in a judgment.
P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).

Frampton

v.

Wilson,

605

There is no statute which would authorize

plaintiff to recover as costs its expenditures for photocopies,
overnight mail, courier, postage, and online research.
Additionally, plaintiff's "Exhibit B Costs" lists two
expenditures of $80 each and one expenditure for $130 which all
represent that they are for "Marin service of process - Service
of Process, Miami, Florida."

Mr. Marin is unaware of any

legitimate reason why three service of process charges would have
been required.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Marin respectfully requests that
the trial court's March 26, 2008 Order granting plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be reversed, that the Final
Judgment be vacated, and that this case be remanded to the trial

26

court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's
decision.
DATED t h i s ^

. /1
Vjay of March 2009.

llant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigned^certifies that two copies of the foregoing were
mailed this 2 _ day of March 2009 via first class U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Barnard N. Madsen
Scott D. Preston
FILLMORE SPENCER, LC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
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FILED
f
Mart V. J 2008
<• i - ' - ' S T R I C T
STPTZ. OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

Barnard N. Madsen (4626)
Scott D.Preston (11019)
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 426-8200
Fax: 426-8208
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 060402237
CARLOS MARIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Judge Samuel McVey
Division 1

Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Plaintiff) is a Utah limited liability company.
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Defendant") is an individual who resides in Miami, Florida. The
matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment.
I. Undisputed Material Facts
The following undisputed facts are taken from the parties' pleadings with citations to the
record omitted.

A.

Valid Contract

After negotiations, Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, executed, a written agreement
("Agreement") with Defendant on 12 January 2005.
In their Agreement, Defendant expressly represented and warranted that he had
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader", had "numerous contacts with potential
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors with
the Company", and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services such as the
duties as contemplated herein."
Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the signature blocks,
is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part:

"there are no

representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in connection with the
subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein."
B.

Plaintiffs Obligations

Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant advance
payments of
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005);
$25,000 on 15 February 2005;
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and
$25,000 on 15 April 2005.
According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance bonuses
were to help Defendant devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting additional
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distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended "to entice
[Defendant] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it. Also, [they]
will provide him with a quick resource of cash to build the business."
Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any payments
due Defendant for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses.
Under paragraph 4.3, Plaintiff gave Defendant a product credit of $5,000 for January
2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new
Distributor/Leaders."
C.

Defendant's Obligations

Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed to "devote his full time and
attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Plaintiffs products.
Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed that he would meet the
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates:
$5,000 by 15 February 2005;
$30,000 by 15 March 2005;
$100,000 by 15 April 2005;
$300,000 by 15 May 2005;
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and
$900,000 by 15 July 2005.
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Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Defendant's payment of Plaintiff s "loss
and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention . . . of any of the terms and conditions
imposed on [Defendant] pursuant to this Agreement."
D.

Plaintiffs Performance and Defendant's Breach

On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement, Plaintiff paid
Defendant a $25,000 advance.
On 15 February 2005, Defendant met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales volume
performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $25,000 advance.
On 15 March 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his $30,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
On 15 March 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $15,000 advance based on
Defendant's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 performance guarantee of
$30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005.
On 15 April 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let alone his
15 April 2005 $100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under
paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement.
Through June 2006, Defendant had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume.
E.

Damages

Plaintiff paid Defendant $65,000.00 in advances.
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In 2005 and 2006, Defendant earned a total of $3,637.57 in commissions from Plaintiff.
Defendant never earned "Fast Cash" bonus payments.
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the "monies advanced to [Defendant] will be
offset by any payments due [Defendant] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated below. Also,
these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Defendant] each month as
calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . . If any of the advanced amounts are not
repaid by the commission payouts or Fast Cash at the end of the guaranteed payments, these
amounts will be deducted from any future commission payout. . . ."
II. Discussion
A.

Legal Standards

1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
Rule 56; see also Billings ex. rel. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991).
2.

Contract Interpretation.

"[Interpretation of a contract is a question of law."

Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1983), citing Morris v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983).

"A completely integrated

agreement must be interpreted on its face." Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15 ^f
28 (Utah 2004).
3. Material Breach Excuses Nonbreaching Party's Further Performance. "The law
is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by
the nonbreaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App.
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1994), dtmg, Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah App. 1992); Wright v. Westside
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1990).
4. Prejudgment Interest. Prejudgment interest may be recovered where the damage is
complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss is measurable by
facts and figures. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). "Unless parties to a
lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." Utah Code Ana.
§ 15-1-1 (2006).
B.

Elements of Proof for a Breach of Contract Claim

To prevail on its breach of contract claim, Plaintiff must prove (1) a valid contract, (2)
performance by Plaintiff, (3) breach by Defendant, and (4) damages. Bair v. Axiom Design,
L.L.C., 20 P.3d 388, 392 ^ 14 (Utah 2001).
Each of these elements is undisputed based on the parties' submissions.
C,

Defendant's Claims

However, Defendant claims that his performance was excused because of Plaintiffs prior
material breach of an oral term by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported deadline.
Defendant also claims that his assertions concern a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. At oral argument, Defendant's counsel argued and directed the Court's attention to the
Restatement of Contracts, Second § 216, and to FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617
P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1980) in support of Defendant's position that the contract was not
completely integrated.
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Defendant's claims are without merit.
1.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendant's claim of Plaintiff s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is misplaced. It is well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a written agreement. Slicex, Inc. v.
Aeroflex Colorado Springs. Inc.. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74234 n.l ('The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is 'implied in contracts "to protect the express covenants or promises
of the contract.'" ... c[T]he doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not serve to import new
obligations into a contract. It merely controls how the obligations stated within the contract are to
be performed.'").
2.

The Parol Evidence Rule

Defendant's claim that Plaintiff breached a purported oral term necessarily implicates the
parol evidence rule. It is well settled that "the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the absence of
fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations,
representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an
integrated contract." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah
1995) (italics in original) citing inter alia Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah
1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981).
Under the parol evidence rule, the Court must undertake a two-step analysis. First, is the
parties' Agreement integrated? Second, did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud?
a. Is the Agreement integrated? "[B]efore considering the applicability of the parol
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evidence rule in a contract dispute, the Court must first determine that the parties intended the
writing to be an integration. To resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is
admissible." Hall 890 P.2d at 1026.
Based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court concludes as a
preliminary matter that the parties intended their Agreement to be a complete integration and the
final expression of their agreement.
The Court's determination is based in part on the express integration provision directly
over Defendant's signature in the Agreement itself which Defendant has neither disputed nor
explained. Although not conclusive, the Court finds this express provision particularly
persuasive.
Further, the Agreement itself sets out in detail the rights and obligations of the parties,
including various deadlines for their performance. It therefore begs the question: if, as
Defendant contends, the purported term that Plaintiff breached was so critical to Defendant's
performance, why was it not included in the parties' Agreement?
Finally, the email communications between Defendant and Plaintiff submitted to the Court
are devoid of any reference by Defendant to Plaintiffs breach of this purported critical term.
The Court finds particularly persuasive an email exchange between Defendant and Plaintiffs
general counsel on February 3, 2005, two days after the deadline Defendant contends that
Plaintiff was to provide promised "marketing tools". Instead of complaining about how
Plaintiffs recent breach would prevent his further performance, Defendant represented that he
could expand Plaintiffs business into several foreign markets. Indeed, In the submissions before
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the Court, there is no written notice of the purported breach to give Plaintiff the contractuallyrequired 10-day opportunity to cure.
The Court notes that oral representations of additional terms have been accepted by other
courts notwithstanding an integration clause in a written agreement. But those cases are most
often in the context of a construction contract where the performance of the parties manifests
their agreement or consent to "extras" beyond a written agreement. Therefore, those cases are
distinguishable.
Further, Defendant's assertions of Plaintiff s representations lack foundation as to the
circumstances including who made the purported representation or representations and when
such representations were made.
In sum, based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court rejects
Defendant's assertions that the parties intended to be bound by terms not found in their written
Agreement and concludes as a threshold matter that the parties' Agreement was integrated.
th Did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud?
Nowhere in his pleadings or submissions to this Court did Defendant claim that the parties'
Agreement was ambiguous or that it was induced by fraud. On the contrary, he contended that
the Agreement was a "valid contract" but that Plaintiff was the one who breached it.
Thus, in the absence of any claim of fraud or ambiguity, Defendant's assertions offered for
the purpose of adding to the terms of the parties' integrated Agreement must be excluded. Hall
890 P.2d at 1026-27.
As to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim involving a product credit Plaintiff provided to
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Defendant, Defendant's order of product in excess of that credit, and the amount due to Plaintiff,
the Court finds that there is a dispute as to the material facts. Therefore, the Court denies any
relief to Plaintiff on that portion of its breach of contract claim at this point in the proceedings.
Plaintiffs Remedy
Based on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law (and pursuant to the parties'
Agreement), Plaintiff is entitled to the difference between the advances it paid to Defendant
($65,000.00) and the commissions Defendant earned ($3,637.57). Plaintiff is thus entitled to
damages in the amount of $61,362.43.
Because that damage amount was complete and fixed as of April 15, 2005 and is
measurable by facts and figures, Plaintiff is also entitled to 10% prejudgment interest (simple no
compounded) from April 15, 2005 through October 1, 2007, the date upon which the Court ruled
that the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the statutory rate commencing on the
date this ordered is entered.
Because Plaintiff is the prevailing party herein, it is entitled under the Pairties' Agreement
to its attorney fees and costs. Since Plaintiff has outstanding claims that remain to be tried, the
Court defers a ruling on the amount of Plaintiff s attorney fees and costs until the conclusion of
the case and entry of a final judgment.

[ THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ]
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E.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GBAJSTTED in part and DEIHED in part, and Defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
DATED this

£-£>

day of

/ w c H

2007.

OV '

v

TEjE HONORABLE SAMUEL MCVEY
' DISTMCT^OURT JUDGE
v 4

- «i'_ J „>* 1 '

Apppovedyas to form:
S^ott^KMitcheU
Attorney for Defendant

£

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the ORDER to be faxed and
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this \IQ day of March, 2008, to the following:
Scott B. Mitchell
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Attorney for defendant
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4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

Barnard N. Madsen (4626)
Scott D.Preston (11019)
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
3301 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 426-8200
Fax: 426-8208
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Tk'»^'^ T *''^CUCUF l h-Tr , TAT A T

TT TT\ f~°* Ti /TT? TVTT

FROl^SEJLT^lJNAL J UDGMLJN1

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 060402237
CARLOS MARIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Judge Samuel McVey
Division 1

WHEREFORE, having heard oral arguments on this matter, having considered pleadings,
prior orders and argument of counsel and pursuant to the Court's Order granting Plaintiffs
motion for partial summary judgment consistent with the Court's ruling on October 1, 2007, the
Court hereby enters judgment as follows:
1.

In favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the principle amount of $61,362.43.

2.

Prejudgment interest at 10% per year (simple not compounded) from April 15, 2005

through October 1, 2007 in the amount of $15,128.48. ($6,136.24 per year; $16.80 per day for

two (2) years and 170 days.)
3.

Post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 5.42% from commencing March 26,

2008, the date Judgment is entered.
4.

As the prevailing party and pursuant to the Parties' Agreement, Plainti ff is entitled to

its attorney fees and costs in the amount of $45,502.43. (See Affidavit of Attorney Fees and
Costs filed concurrently with this Proposed Final Judgment.)
5.

Total Judgment in the amount of $121,993.34.

6.

This Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's

fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit, including the costs of appeal, pursuant to the contract at issue.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the PROPOSED FINAL
JUDGMENT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this ^ /
following:
Scott B. Mitchell
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Attorney for defendant
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day of May, 2008, to the

